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On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct
Frank H. Easterbrook *
Aggressive, competitive conduct by a monopolist is highly
beneficial to consumers. Courts should prize and encourage it
under the antitrust laws. Aggressive, exclusionary conduct by a
monopolist is deleterious to consumers. Courts should condemn it
under the antitrust laws. There is only one problem. Competitive
and exclusionary conduct look alike. The dominant firm is an ag-
gressor and expands its market share at the expense of its smaller
rival. The rival yelps and sues.
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 1 offers an illustra-
tion. For many years Aspen Skiing Co. (Skiing), which operated the
slopes of three mountains near Aspen, and Aspen Highlands (High-
lands), which operated the slopes of one mountain, had sold a
ticket allowing skiiers to ski any mountain's slopes for six days.
About a third of all skiing was paid for through one of these multi-
mountain, six-day tickets. Skiing and Highlands split the revenues
according to the popularity of the slopes. In the early 1970s, High-
lands took in between 13% and 18% of the total from these joint
tickets. In 1978 Skiing ended the cooperation by demanding that
Highlands accept only 12.5% of the take, a deal Highlands would
not accept. When Highlands tried to revive a multi-mountain ticket
by buying Skiing's tickets and packaging them with its own, Skiing
refused to sell; when Highlands gave its patrons scrip that they
could tender to Skiing for lift tickets, and that Skiing could redeem
at face value, Skiing refused to accept the scrip. Skiing also
changed its price structure, charging $22 for a daily ticket to one of
its three mountains but only $114 ($19 per day) for a six-day ticket,
making it more expensive for skiiers to switch between Highlands'
trails and Skiing's by the day. Highlands' share of revenues from
the four mountains fell to 11% by 1981. It sued; the jury found
that Skiing had violated section 2 of the Sherman Act; the Supreme
Court agreed.
The Court treated Skiing as a monopolist, though one must
wonder of what. Most good skiing slopes are not in Aspen, and
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, Uni-
versity of Chicago.
1 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985).
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
monopolistic prices in Aspen would simply induce skiiers to go to
Vail or St. Moritz. But the parties did not labor the point, and
neither will 1.2 The Court thought that three things condemned
Skiing's non-cooperation as exclusionary conduct: the four-moun-
tain ticket was beneficial to skiiers, the exclusion of Highlands in-
jured it, and there was no business justification for the change of
policy.3 Any change that injured Skiing's rival had to be justified,
and this was not.
The opinion creates a trap. If two firms start cooperating, the
larger cannot back out without a good business purpose. But if the
cooperation continues, that, too, must be justified by a good busi-
ness purpose.4 If the business purpose is hard to define, then the
firm is damned if it keeps cooperating and damned if it stops. Why
is this? Because juries have good records in finding business pur-
poses and separating economic efficiency from exclusionary con-
duct? Hardly. The reason, as the Court sees things, must be that
continued cooperation could be monopolistic and desisting from
cooperation could be exclusionary; either could be injurious to
consumers. Yet the decision implicit in Aspen to assign the burden
ofjustification to the defendant-whether the defendant is seeking
to explain the cooperation or the lack of cooperation-poses big
risks. If the true economic effects of a business practice are hard to
know, let alone to prove in court, then putting the burden on the
defendant is bound to create systematic error.
II
Vigorous competition "excludes" rivals. The more successful
a firm is at reducing the cost of its product or making that product
more attractive to consumers, the more it sells. In the end a very
successful firm will wind up with the whole market. The objective is
to find ways to separate this from the kind of exclusion that injures
consumers. The Court put the difference this way: "[I]t is relevant
to consider [the conduct's] impact on consumers and whether it has
impaired competition in an unnecessarily restrictive way. If a firm
2 Indeed, Skiing kicked away its strongest points one after another. It did not chal-
lenge the definition of the market as the four mountains near Aspen. 105 S. Ct. at 2854
n.20. It did not argue that the initial cooperation between Highlands and Skiing raised
questions under § 1 of the Sherman Act, questions that would have compelled a dissolu-
tion. Id. at 2855.n.22. It did riot challenge the instructions to the jury. It did not argue
that its posture toward Highlands had any legitimate business justification. Id. at 2860. So
the case may be a sport, governing only masochistic litigants. I put all of this to one side in
order to see whether the decision has anything constructive to say about how to distinguish
exclusionary conduct from aggressive competition.
3 105 S. Ct. at 2859-62.
4 See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 104 S.
Ct. 2948 (1984).
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has been 'attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than
efficiency,' it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory." 5
Good enough in principle, but this poses a new question. How can
we tell when conduct excludes rivals "on some basis other than
efficiency?"
Exclusion "on some basis other than efficiency" might take two
forms. The first is predatory behavior, perhaps the charging of low
prices, that makes it unprofitable for the rival to compete. If a dom-
inant firm can both drive its rival out of the market and erect barri-
ers to the entry of new rivals, it may raise its prices in the future.6
The second is raising rivals' costs. If a firm can present its rivals
with costs it does not face, the rivals must raise their price. The
dominant firm can do likewise and make a profit. 7 The two strate-
gies imply different consequences. During an episode of predatory
conduct the price must fall and output rise; later, during the re-
coupment period, the price must rise substantially. If a firm raises
its rival's costs, the price in the market will rise at once and total
output will fall, but the predator's share of the output will rise. It
may be possible to look for these signs, but the search will be hard.
The Supreme Court did not look for these signs in Aspen. In-
stead it paid substantial attention to things that do not differentiate
competition and exclusion. It inquired whether ending the four-
mountain ticket harmed Highlands. Of course it did-both compe-
tition and exclusion harm rivals. We learn nothing from this. It
inquired whether Skiing had changed a longstanding practice. Of
course it had-both an outbreak of competition after a period of
cartelization and exclusionary conduct entail change. Change is
ambiguous. It inquired whether buyers preferred the four-moun-
tain ticket to other methods of selling lift tickets. Of course some
buyers did-before 1978 about one-third of buyers had bought
these tickets. But then two-thirds had bought tickets in other ways,
and any change of business practices and products will disappoint
the people who used the old ones. Competition is no different
from exclusion in this respect; there must be many who wish that
Ford still made the Edsel, and at the right price the Lockheed
L-!0 11 would have been a great success. 8
5 105 S. Ct. at 2859 (footnotes omitted) (quoting from R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARA-
DOX 138 (1978)).
6 See Areeda & Turner, Predatoiy Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman
Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975); Easterbrook, PredatoU, Strategies and Counteystrategies, 48 U.
CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981).
7 G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67-70 (1968); Salop & Scheffman, Rais-
ing Rivals' Costs, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267 (1983).
8 On the effects of changing one's products, see, e.g., MCI Communications Corp. v.
AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Telex
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So the Court's position resolves to a conclusion that a domi-
nant firm that imposes large costs on its rival must have a good
business justification (one "consistent with efficiency") and be able
to persuade the jury of it. No intermediate questions, no indica-
tors, no steps on the way to decision. Just ask the ultimate ques-
tion. Was it efficient or was it not? Whichever way the jury decides,
goes.
The Court is not alone in thinking that the defendant should
be asked to justify its conduct and pay the penalty if it fails. 9 But
why? This means that the plaintiff wins whenever the defendant
does not know or cannot explain the true function of its conduct.
In business the only thought may be to make as much money as
possible, and entrepreneurs often flounder from one practice to an-
other trying to find one that works. When they do, they may not
know why it works, whether because of efficiency or exclusion.
They know only that it works. If they know why it works, they may
be unable to articulate the reason to their lawyers-because they
are not skilled in the legal and economic jargon in which such
"business justifications" must be presented in court, or perhaps be-
cause their lawyers cannot understand (or translate for a jury) what
they have been told.
If the entrepreneurs were economists, they would not be any
more articulate. It takes economists years, sometimes decades, to
understand why certain business practices work, to determine
whether they work because of increased efficiency or exclusion. To
award victory to the plaintiff because the defendant has failed to
justify the conduct properly is to turn ignorance, of which we have
regrettably much, into prohibition. That is a hard transmutation to
justify.'0
Such explanations as there are tend to be vague, hard to verify,
even damning. Consider an explanation Skiing might have offered
for cutting Highlands out of the multi-mountain ticket. It might
have said that Highlands was an inefficient "fringe" firm taking a
free ride on the fact that Skiing had developed the resort's principal
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Easter-
brook, supra note 6, at 304-12.
9 See, e.g., VII P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1506 (1986); R. BORK, supra note 5, at 157;
General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Posner, J.).
10 See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1, 4-9 (1984); Easterbrook, Is
There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEX. L. REv. 705, 707-10 (1982). Ronald Coase wrote
about the wisest thing that has been said on this subject: "If an economist [or a judge!]
finds something... that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation.
And as in this field we are rather ignorant, the number of ununderstandable practices tends
to be rather large, and the reliance on monopoly explanations frequent." R. COASE, Indus-
trial Organization: A Proposal for Research, in 3 POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES
IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 59, 67 (V. Fuchs ed. 1972).
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mountains and attracted tourists, which Highlands diverted once
they were in Aspen. Highlands' mountain was below average in at-
tractiveness; why else did it get only 13% to 18% of the business
from the four-mountain ticket? The four-mountain ticket gave
Highlands an opportunity to divert skiiers at no marginal cost to
the skiiers. Skiing might believe that it was entitled to compensa-
tion for providing Highlands with a pool of ready customers and
facilitating their migration to Highlands' mountain. The demand
that Highlands accept 12.5% of the proceeds, even if in an average
year skiiers spent 16% of their time on Highlands' slopes, could
have been a way to compensate Skiing for producing the customers.
Similar arguments about "property rights in customers" have been
made by respected economists." Moreover, Skiing might have ar-
gued that economies of scale called for the use of only three rather
than four mountains. Assembling skiiers in larger numbers (per
mountain) would make use of the lifts more efficient, allow the ski
patrol to handle more skiiers per patrolman, and so on. The multi-
mountain ticket might have diverted skiiers to Highlands, prevent-
ing the realization of these efficiencies.
Maybe these are real efficiencies, maybe they are fairy tales. It
would be very hard to devise tests within the two or three years
allowed by the process of litigation. (Even antitrust cases do not
last forever.) Suppose the lawyers could find economists who
would test these propositions and present the tests to the jury.
What would happen? Explanations of this sort sound like justifica-
tions of monopoly, not demonstrations of how the exclusion of
Highlands from the multi-mountain ticket was "competitive."
Counsel for Highlands would say that Skiing may not extol the vir-
tues of a reduction in competition. This would be a bad argument.
Highlands would be focusing attention on the process of daily ri-
valry as "competition," while Skiing's hypothetical explanation
demonstrates efficiencies, viewed ex ante. But the processes of liti-
gation-especially litigation conducted to lay deciders who may
know nothing of the industry and see the inside of a courtroom but
once-favor arguments based on fair ex post divisions of gains.12 It
is very hard to justify any unusual business conduct even to a panel
of economists. The economists, quite properly, want more data
and more time. The process of litigation, in which a plaintiff suffer-
ing real injury confronts a defendant offering abstruse explana-
tions, does not hold out much promise for finding economic truth.
To require the defendant to show that its conduct is efficient is to
11 See Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Impeect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Sen'-
ices, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 736 (1984); Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1982).
12 See Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5-7, 10-12 (1984).
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hand victory to the plaintiff in a large number of cases no matter
whether the defendant's conduct helped or harmed consumers.
III
Aspen is in many ways an advance in the application of eco-
nomic analysis to antitrust law. It focuses attention on price and
output. It calls for resolution of the question whether the business
conduct is efficient. The Court scorned the use of "intent," point-
ing out that intent is useful only to the extent it helps a court decide
whether the conduct is efficient or exclusionary.' 3 Objective indica-
tors, not intent, are what matter. These are conclusions for which
many have lobbied in their scholarly writing, and the lobbying has
paid off. The Court cited Robert Bork's work from beginning to
end.
Yet two very important economic lessons are unlearned. With-
out these the rest are useless or worse. The first is that the legal
system must minimize the sum of error and process costs. A rule
that tilts things in plaintiffs' favor (by demanding explanations from
defendants) ensures that much desirable conduct will be con-
demned. Some will be doomed in litigation, some will be aban-
doned as firms try to avoid the risk of wrongful condemnation.
There is no sense in Aspen that false positives are harmful or com-
mon, yet they are. Just the previous term, the Court saw both the
harms of false positives and the difficulty of separating competition
from exclusion.' 4 More recently the Court examined the logic of
the economic arguments implicit in an antitrust claim and, finding
the logic faulty, rejected the claim.15 One wonders what changed in
Aspen. False positives are at least as harmful as false negatives. I
have argued elsewhere that false positives are much more harmful
than false negatives.' 6 Market processes undercut monopolies
wrongfully permitted, but no similar processes undercut judicial
decisions that wrongly condemn efficient conduct. Judges hearing
antitrust cases have a lousy record in separating economic wisdom
from fallacy; this is the central point ofJudge Bork's book, cited so
often in Aspen. We should not expect judges to improve their rec-
ord by very much; the rules must accommodate the judges' limits,
rather than the other way around. In other fields, the inability of
judges to decide what is efficient business conduct and what is not
13 105 S. Ct. at 2857. See also Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227,
232 (1st Cir. 1983) (Breyer, J.); Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d
1325, 1338-39 (7th Cir. 1986).
14 Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-69, 771, 775-77
(1984).
15 Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1357-62 (1986).
16 Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 10, at 15-17.
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is a foundation for powerful rules compelling judges to keep their
hands off-in corporate law this is known as the business judgment
doctrine. Why should antitrust law demand of judges and juries
answers that other branches of the law know courts cannot supply?
The second lesson is that it is pointless to ask the ultimate
question-"is it efficient?"-without offering some criteria. Throw-
ing this marshmallow at a jury is not going to get the results we
seek. A fog-bound instruction of the sort given in Aspen ensures
that confusion and random results will emerge, ensures, in other
words, more false positives and false negatives than under the old
regime.
Courts must change the way they think about antitrust. Now
that efficiency is the standard by which business practices are to be
gauged, courts must approach the task of finding efficiency in the
same way a social scientist would. The court must formulate a hy-
pothesis and test that hypothesis against the facts. The court
should accept only the hypotheses that tally with observation.
Forming and testing hypotheses is not the ordinary work of lawyers
and judges, but it has become essential.
What are the hypotheses in Aspen? One is that the change is
efficient (or neutral). If the change is efficient, the output of skiing
services in the market should rise. Add together the output
(number of skiier-days) of the two firms. Is it up? The Court does
not say. The raw data may not be enough. Perhaps skiing in Aspen
is up less (more) than skiing in other resorts. There are statistical
techniques to strip away other variables.1 7 Another hypothesis is
that Skiing was engaged in predation. This implies that prices for
Aspen's four mountains fell as Skiing tried to take business away
from Highlands. Then, the hypothesis would continue, Highlands
eventually would withdraw from the market so that Skiing would
raise its price.
The hypothesis of predation is inconsistent with the Court's
assumption that Skiing raised its prices. It is also pretty implausible
no matter what the price data show. Predatory conduct works only
if the predator can force the competing assets from the market.
Otherwise these assets stand by as a source of competition,
preventing the predator from raising prices to recoup. No matter
how Skiing tried, it was unlikely to force Highlands Mountain out of
the Aspen "market." Where would the mountain go? Exit barriers
defeat predatory strategies. True, Highlands might close up shop
for a year or two, but it could reopen the slopes whenever Skiing
tried to take advantage of its position. This hypothesis therefore
cannot explain the events we observed.
17 See Rubinfeld, Econometrics in tie Courtroom, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1048 (1985).
[Vol. 61:972
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Still a third hypothesis is that Skiing was trying to raise its ri-
val's costs by cutting off an efficient marketing strategy (the multi-
mountain ticket) that was more valuable to Highlands than it was to
Skiing. Skiing had three mountains even after bouncing Highlands
from the package. If Skiing could raise Highland's marginal costs,
it could raise its own prices. The implications of this hypothesis
are: higher prices for all skiing in Aspen, higher market share for
Skiing, a lower number of skiiers at Skiing, a lower number of
skiiers for Aspen as a whole, and a differential change in profits
(Skiing's up, Highlands' down). The first two implications (higher
prices and higher market share for Skiing) were confirmed, accord-
ing to the Court. The last three were not tested. We do not know
whether Aspen lost ground to other resorts, whether Skiing got
more customers or fewer, or how Skiing's profits changed in com-
parison to Highlands. (We know that Highlands' dropped, but if
times were bad all over, Skiing's profits would have dropped too.)
The hypothesis remains to be proved.
Notice that the "efficiency" hypothesis shares some of the pre-
dictions of the "raising rivals' costs" hypothesis. If Highlands was
stealing customers Skiing had attracted to Aspen, that would de-
press prices for all four mountains and raise Highlands' profits. A
correction of Highlands' free riding would reduce Highlands' sales,
profits, and market share, and raise average prices. But it also
would allow Skiing profitably to attract more tourists to Aspen and
take better care of them, so that the number of skiiers at Skiing's
three mountains, and the total business of the resort, would rise.
Only the direction of this change in output distinguishes the hy-
potheses. Yet the parties never determined what happened to out-
put in Aspen.
Until the Court sends judges and juries off to test hypotheses
and answer questions such as these, it cannot bring rationality to
antitrust litigation. Jurors have no interior compasses that help
them determine which business practices are efficient. Neither do
judges, lawyers, economists, or business executives. To set the jury
adrift on uncharted seas-and then to defer to whatever it does-is
to introduce considerable risk into all business decisions. And for
no good purpose.
Elaborate econometric measures of output may help answer
the essential questions, but often they are indeterminate. In a case
such as Aspen, a quick and dirty answer would have prevented the
need for complex inquiry. Aspen is not a market, so who cares what
Skiing did? It could not monopolize peripatetic skiiers with the
world only a jet ride away. It is just as well to avoid econometric
answers when we can. They are expensive as well as potentially
indeterminate. Often the only way to tell what is efficient is to look
1986]
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at what survives in competition. Then we invent hypotheses to ex-
plain the survival.18 A survivorship test works far too slowly to be
useful in antitrust litigation, yet anything else is neither easy nor
accurate. To assign burdens in a world with costly information-
that is, in our world-is to conclude the inquiry in too many cases.
So the sin of Aspen is putting on defendants a burden they
often cannot carry. In other parts of the law, the Court requires the
defendant to produce an explanation and then requires the plaintiff
to show the explanation wrong.' 9 Why should things be otherwise
in antitrust? Too many practices are too mysterious for too long.
Even if 99% of businesses can explain what they do (and convince
jurors of the explanation), there is a selection bias. Plaintiffs will
sue the other 1%. The result will be riddled with error. What we
need is a set of intelligent presumptions, not a stab at the ultimate
question of efficiency. But I have made that argument before.20
18 G. STIGLER, supra note 7, at 72-80; Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J. L. EcON. &
ORG. 177 (1985).
19 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).
20 Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 10.
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